Thursday, November 17, 2005

What we DID find in Iraq

The pre-war intelligence about WMD wasn't all bad. Here is the mostly ignored testimony of weapons inspector David Kay, presented to Congress on October 2, 2003.

I would really like to hear what Senators Reid, Kennedy and Rockerfeller and the others have to say about it.

"What have we found and what have we not found in the first 3 months of our work?

"We have discovered dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002. The discovery of these deliberate concealment efforts have come about both through the admissions of Iraqi scientists and officials concerning information they deliberately withheld and through physical evidence of equipment and activities that ISG has discovered that should have been declared to the UN. Let me just give you a few examples of these concealment efforts, some of which I will elaborate on later:

"A clandestine network of laboratories and safehouses within the Iraqi Intelligence Service that contained equipment subject to UN monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW research.

"A prison laboratory complex, possibly used in human testing of BW agents, that Iraqi officials working to prepare for UN inspections were explicitly ordered not to declare to the UN.

"Reference strains of biological organisms concealed in a scientist's home, one of which can be used to produce biological weapons.

"New research on BW-applicable agents, Brucella and Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF), and continuing work on ricin and aflatoxin were not declared to the UN.

"Documents and equipment, hidden in scientists' homes, that would have been useful in resuming uranium enrichment by centrifuge and electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS).

"A line of UAVs not fully declared at an undeclared production facility and an admission that they had tested one of their declared UAVs out to a range of 500 km, 350 km beyond the permissible limit.

"Continuing covert capability to manufacture fuel propellant useful only for prohibited SCUD variant missiles, a capability that was maintained at least until the end of 2001 and that cooperating Iraqi scientists have said they were told to conceal from the UN.

"Plans and advanced design work for new long-range missiles with ranges up to at least 1000 km - well beyond the 150 km range limit imposed by the UN. Missiles of a 1000 km range would have allowed Iraq to threaten targets through out the Middle East, including Ankara, Cairo, and Abu Dhabi.

"Clandestine attempts between late-1999 and 2002 to obtain from North Korea technology related to 1,300 km range ballistic missiles --probably the No Dong -- 300 km range anti-ship cruise missiles, and other prohibited military equipment."


Much more available at the link below.

STATEMENT BY DAVID KAY ON THE INTERIM PROGRESS REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE IRAQ SURVEY GROUP (ISG)

1 Comments:

At 11:23 AM, Blogger Christopher said...

"The pre-war intelligence about WMD wasn't all bad"

When I read all this evidence of "weapons of mass destruction program related activities" I can only come to the conclusion that the UN inspectors had been doing their job. What we found in Iraq weren't weapons of mass destruction, but scattered devices and plans that could potentially have been used to produce WMDs - thus the WMDPRA label. This would be similar to a SWAT team storming my home, finding a receipt for some rifle ammunition and a drawing I made of Bush with an X over his face, and claiming I was attempting to assassinate the president.

People who look through keyholes are apt to see things that are keyhole-shaped.

 

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